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I

ABSTRACT: Drawing on Samuel P. Huntington’s three phases of self-regulation
used to determine if an occupation qualifies as a profession, this article focuses on
the third phase of policing and removing those who fail to uphold the standards
set forth in the first two phases. It reviews how the Army implemented this phase
following the Civil War through the post–Vietnam War years and the implications
for the officer corps.

n the 64 years since its publication, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and
the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations has inspired an extensive
literature on military professionalism. In keeping with Huntington’s own focus,
most of the commentary has focused on his concepts of proper civil-military relations,
such as objective control, corporate identity, responsibility to society, and apolitical
service. What has seldom been addressed is the implication behind his assertion
that the officers in the armed forces were professionals because there existed “an
organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence
and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.”1 In short,
three phases of self-regulation—defining its ethics and proficiencies, credentialing
its members, and policing and removing those who failed to uphold those standards—
were essential to determining whether an occupation qualifies as a profession. While
the first two aspects of self-regulation have generated a great deal of literature, there
has been little study of the last.
This article redresses this imbalance by examining the US Army’s self-policing
efforts in the decades between the 1890s to the 1950s that Huntington used
as his model. It then extends its analysis to the volunteer professional force of the
post-Vietnam era. It will focus not on the discharge of officers for ethical or physical
causes, but on the elimination of deadwood—the substandard, the incompetent,
the placeholders who, like Beetle Bailey’s General Halftrack, continue to be not
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New
York: Vintage Books, 1957), 10. For a small sample of the scholarship that expands on Huntington’s thesis, see
James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power (New York: Free
Press, 1981); Risa Brooks, “Beyond Huntington: US Military Professionalism Today,” Parameters 51 (Spring
2021): 65–77; J. P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2017); Edward M. Coffman, “The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State,” Journal
of Military History 55 (January 1991): 69–82; William B. Skelton, “Samuel B. Huntington and the Roots of
American Military Tradition,” Journal of Military History 60 (April 1996): 325–38. Don M. Snider has
commented extensively on Army professionalism and ethics. For example, see Don M. Snider, “Reviewing the
Motivational Power of the Army’s Professional Ethic,” Parameters 44 (Autumn 2014): 7–12.
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only retained, but promoted. On an institutional level, it provides context on an
impediment to officer corps excellence that has concerned the service throughout
its existence. On an individual level, it addresses a question most officers have
asked themselves at least once: “How is that person still in uniform?”

Post-Civil War Era
Huntington began his study with the post–Civil War decades. For the
30-year period after Reconstruction the strength of the officer corps was fixed
at 2,200, creating a closely knit community. Upon commissioning in the Regular
Army, each officer received a number and advanced in seniority within their
branch or bureau as fast as officers ahead of them were promoted, retired, or died.
Although West Point held a virtual monopoly on new commissions, Civil War
veterans dominated the field grades and could be found commanding companies
as late as 1898. Most regarded officership as a sinecure for loyal service rather
than a profession, to be held until retirement at 45 years of service or the age
of 62 (after 1870). Their horizons were confined by decades spent in garrison
life, limited by the incessant routines of drill, administration, supervising
fatigue (work) details of perhaps 20 men, and social events: “soldiering had
long since become a chore to them, and they were not looking for work.”2 The
mediocrity of so many of their colleagues outraged progressives. In 1884,
Lieutenant Arthur Wagner put forward as a professional standard for any regular
officer the ability to command a wartime regiment. He noted sarcastically that
many who wore epaulets could not discharge a sergeant’s duties.3 That same year,
Commanding General Philip Sheridan told Congress the primary impediment
to Army efficiency was the overabundance of sick, crippled, and otherwise
incapacitated officers.4
In 1890 in what might be interpreted as the first effort at mandating
professional self-policing, Congress, despite significant Regular Army opposition,
required both annual efficiency reports and examinations for promotion up
to major. An officer who failed his examination lost his place on the seniority
list; if he failed again, he was discharged. Although the exam itself was rigorous,
there is no evidence of any officers, veteran or not, being discharged for
failing. In 1896 when Lieutenant William Carey Brown suggested that officers
incapable of physically or mentally performing their duties be retired, an officer
retorted it was better to have an infirm lieutenant of 60 then to force out a loyal
2. Hunter Liggett, A. E. F.: Ten Years Ago in France (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1928), 260; and
J. A. Dapray, “A Subaltern’s View of the Army,” United Service 5 (December 1881): 707–12.
3. Arthur L. Wagner, “The Military Necessities of the United States, and the Best Provisions for Meeting
Them,” Journal of the Military Service Institution 5 (September 1884): 262.
4. Report of the Secretary of War: Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of
Congress, 48th Cong. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1884), 50.
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officer.5 The wars in Cuba and the Philippines demonstrated the consequences
of protecting caste rather than promoting professional merit. One veteran
wrote of his colleagues’ dismay at the “useless slaughter of our men at San Juan
through the worst possible mismanagement” and their bitterness that “the
blunderers were promoted with indecent haste, while most of the army thought
they would be courtmartialed.”6
Huntington considers the “Root reforms as a, if not the fulcrum” in the
transition to a professional officer corps. While it is certainly true the Root era
institutional reforms—the General Staff, the War College, the Leavenworth
schools, and so forth—contributed to professional expertise, did these
reforms result in enhanced professional self-policing? Like Huntington, many
researchers have confused this era’s creation of the aforementioned professional
organizations with the enforcement of higher professional standards but were
these parallel developments? Throughout the decade following Root’s alleged
transformation, there were complaints that the retention of the superannuated
ensured the “dead stagnation in promotion.”7 In 1905, only 11 of the 346
officers taking promotion exams failed, and not a few of these due to moral or
medical causes.8 A 1909 report by a major general noted many “officers utterly
incompetent for the commands they exercise have clearly demonstrated their
inefficiency yet under existing regulations and interpretations thereof it has been
found impossible to get rid of these officers.”9 In a 1910 letter to Leonard Wood,
John J. Pershing listed some of the “fossils” he was cursed with: “Colonel Bowen
of the 12th Infantry whose utter inefficiency you are familiar with; Lieutenant
Colonel Ames of the same regiment, whose worthlessness has continued
throughout his army career; and Colonel Dodd of the 12th Cavalry, who has
drunk himself into a hopeless state of imbecility.”10
Pershing’s sentiments, if not his pungent language, were echoed that year in
Chief of Staff J. Franklin Bell’s testimony to the Senate. The Army’s peacetime
promotion policies all but ensured “the minimum of promotion with the
maximum of rust and decrepitude.” Promotion by merit would “kill ambitions and
destroy zeal” and those passed over “would remain to spread dissatisfaction and
5. William C. Brown, “Reorganization and Graded Retirement for the Cavalry,” Journal of the US Cavalry
Association 9 (September 1896): 215–26, 226–35.
6. Charles Morton to his brother, “Philippine Campaigning,” Cavalry Journal 39, no. 138 (January 1929): 20.
7. Lloyd Buchanan, “Army as a Career,” World’s Work 11 (February 1906): 7236–38; and “Eliminating Army
Officers,” Nation 82 (February 1906): 110–11.
8. “Report of the Secretary of War,” in Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1906, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 12, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi
/pt?id=uiug.30112099981158&view=1up&seq=18&skin=2021.
9. “Report of the Philippine Commission,” in Annual Reports of the War Department for Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1909, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 3, 201; and Robert H. Noble,
“Selection versus Seniority,” Infantry Journal 6 (July 1909): 63–77.
10. John J. Pershing to Leonard Wood, February 11, 1910, Box 48, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscripts
Division, Library of Congress.
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discontent and poison the military atmosphere in their vicinity.”11 Bell’s solution
was to increase the number of majors and colonels—the very group he admitted
were the most underperforming—on the grounds it would free up advancement
for lieutenants and captains. Unimpressed by this logic, Congress refused the plan.
Bell’s successor declared all efforts to eliminate “deadwood” in the officer corps
“a practical failure.”12

Era of the World Wars
The post–World War I peacetime force had a similar problem with
self-policing despite both the Regular Army and Congress declaring their
intention to purge the substandard. The 1920 National Defense Act mandated
an annual evaluation for each active-duty officer, first by his immediate superior
and then by the personnel department of his respective branch. Those who
received unsatisfactory ratings (Class B) were to appear before a board for possible
discharge. As with previous (and future) efforts to eliminate officers, this policy
worked better in theory than practice.
The first officer evaluation form was a fiasco. Its 1922 replacement had a
longer tenure, not because it was adequate but because the agencies overseeing
the profession’s self-assessment process could not agree on its revision. In one
respect, the evaluation system did work; it revealed a true Army of Excellence.
In 1926, 11,400 officers were rated; 343 were assessed as superior, 4,323 as above
average, 6,546 as average, and only 86 as below average. The 1927–28 Class B
board with 14,000 potential candidates, classified only 131 into Class B status,
of which only 46 retired or resigned.13 After a thorough study of the process,
Major J. C. F. Tillson of the US Army War College concluded they allowed
poor commanders to intimidate subordinates with the threat of a Class B, “thus
disgusting and losing the true loyalty of the better officers and making the
deceitful ones more cunning.”14 The criticism had merit. From a perspective three
decades later, one prominent military intellectual dated the decline in officer
integrity to making promotion dependent on efficiency reports rather than
examinations. Prior to this, he recalled, officers had obeyed orders with exactitude,
but did not hesitate to disagree with their superiors on military issues in social
11. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs Relating to Various Army Matters of the US Senate
Committee on Military Affairs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), 14–15.
12. “Report of the Secretary of War,” in War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1911), 8, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112099980879&view=1up&seq=16&sk
in=2021
13. “Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1928” in War Department Annual Reports, 1928
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 221, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b49875
85&view=1up&seq=5&skin=2021.
14. J. C. F. Tillson, “Efficiency Reports: How May the Present Report be Improved?,” February 28, 1931,
US Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle, PA; and War Department Annual Reports,
1928, 221.
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settings. Afterwards, they fawned over their seniors and avoided any hint of
independent thought.15
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (OPA-47) represented, in part, another
Congressional effort to impose professional standards and remove subpar officers.
It replaced the century-old process of promotion by lineal seniority with one of
up-or-out merit and established a career path with clear gates to advancement.
Promotion would be rapid in the early grades, with a second lieutenant pinning
on lieutenant’s bars after three years, a captain’s bars after seven years, and
a major’s oak leaves at 14 years. Most careers would end with retirement at
20 years as senior majors with pension, health care, and other benefits. An
ever-shrinking select would progress to lieutenant colonel, colonel, and general,
all but the latter retiring by 30 years with even more generous pensions.
To ensure only the best officers advanced, promotion past lieutenant was
competitive, with each year’s candidates evaluated by selection boards. Officers
turned back twice were dropped from active duty. In theory, the OPA-47 provided
the nation and professional officers with three great benefits. It outlined a fair,
stable, and rewarding path to advancement for an elite of dedicated career officers
while eliminating anyone unable to make the grade. It provided sufficient senior
and field grade officers to prepare the Army in peace and administer and command
the mobilized citizen-soldier forces in war. Finally, it created in the reserves
a second tier of experienced commanders, specialists, and managers who could
be called back to the colors. A fourth benefit was not mentioned, but in making
the officer corps responsible for deciding the standards of merit, it awarded the
professionals autonomy in policing their membership (or what Huntington
termed “objective control”).16
Passed prior to the Cold War buildup, the OPA-47 anticipated an
all-volunteer career force of 50,000 officers and 400,000 enlisted. A decade
later the Army numbered 96,000 officers, with almost 900,000 in other ranks.
Congress deferred to the Armed Forces’ conviction that any future conflict would
require a host of senior managers to direct the nation’s military mobilization
and to train, administer, and command millions of citizen-warriors. In 1946
and 1971 the US Armed Forces were roughly equivalent at 3,000,000—
but in 1971 they boasted 21,000 more majors (or their equivalent), 15,000
more lieutenant colonels, and 4,000 more colonels—and almost 120,000 less
lieutenants! The ensuing emphasis on retaining senior management inflated
these grades far beyond peacetime needs. At the other end, the OPA-47 assumed
a steady, predictable stream of entry-level second lieutenants rising through
15. Conrad H. Lanza, “Military Honor,” Combat Forces Journal 1 (July 1951): 6.
16. Matthew W. Markel, “The Organization Man at War: Promotions Policies and Military Leadership” (PhD
diss., Harvard University, 2000), 200–6.
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in rank and keeping the career escalator moving smoothly. However, what if—
as was demonstrated after OPA-47’s passage—there were too few superior, or
even average lieutenants and captains willing to make the service a profession?
Then the need to maintain the career escalator might force the promotion of the
substandard who remained, adding a new layer of deadwood.17
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 also encouraged Army career managers
to make professional military education one more box to check in the up-orout timelines. According to Michael David Stewart, historian, at the formerly
elite Command and General Staff College, “selection to attend, rather than
learning while in attendance, became a mark of professional achievement.”18
The Army further diluted education credentials by awarding them for
nonacademic duties and keeping high performers out of school. Huntington’s
definition of “expertise” emphasized individual experience was insufficient, and
a profession required “institutions of research and education for the extension
and transmission of professional knowledge and skill.” In the pre–World War II
Army, an officer’s performance at the elite staff and war colleges often played
a significant role in his selection for higher command. In the post–OPA-47
decades, however, the primacy of officer career management could make advanced
professional military education one more box to check: selection to the school
mattered, not excellence once there. Reflecting the emphasis on experience rather
than education, two years into the Korean War, the commandant of the Command
and General Staff College complained that not one of his 900 incoming students
had been a successful regimental commander in that conflict. He dreaded the
imminent bureaucratic fight to have even a few of these elites diverted from their
Pentagon assignments.19

Cold War and Corporatization
As matriculation at the educational institutions that formalized and applied
the standards of professional competence increasingly became rungs up the career
ladder, so the enforcement of standards to remove nonperformers declined. In
the two decades following the passage of OPA-47, the metric to identify both
merit and mediocrity—the Officer Evaluation Report (OER)—was rewritten
an average of once every three years. Surveys found a majority of officers
believed each variation was unfair, and some senior officers refused to follow the
17. Tom Barratt, “The Officer Personnel Act of 1947” (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education
Center, April 1, 1953); and Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the Utilization of Manpower in the Military,
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, HASC No. 92–51, 92nd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971–72), 12241–42.
18. Michael David Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the US Army Command and
General Staff College, 1946–1986” (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 306, https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu
/bitstream/handle/1808/6390/Stewart_ku_0099D_10887_DATA_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
19. Hiram I. Hodes to James A. Van Fleet, May 19, 1952, F-28, Box 69, James A. Van Fleet Papers,
George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA.
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guidelines. Nor did the OER prove an effective pruning tool. The Army
emphasized that all officers with OERs placing them in the bottom 2 percent
must go before a board for possible separation; in the five years prior to 1957
only 220 regular officers were involuntarily eliminated.20 Frustrated by the
bloated officer corps and the inability to remove the substandard, Congress forced
reductions between 1953 and 1957, eliminating 5,500 active-duty officers. Yet
these draconian cuts may have actually increased the proportion of deadwood.
R. N. Young, one of the chief agents in the separation process, estimated the Army
would have purged over twice as many “at the bottom of the efficiency totem
pole” had not “voluntary attrition [of ] our most efficient officers” made their
retention necessary.21
Cuts came largely through outside directives and not the service’s elimination
process. Congress passed the 1960 White Charger Act that removed many of
the World War II cadre who had been rapidly promoted and then went to seed.
In 1964, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel estimated that among 110,000
active-duty officers less than 200 were separated each fiscal year for incompetence
and another 300 for being passed over twice. As a point of comparison,
the Army routinely lost three times as many officers through resignation.22
These resignations were most prevalent among the high-performing junior
officers the service needed to retain, and surveys consistently reported a, if not
the, primary reason was poor leadership. As an unintended consequence, the
generous retirement package provided by the OPA-47 led many officers to opt
for early retirement including roughly two-thirds of the colonels during the
Vietnam War.23
In the wake of the My Lai massacre and the US Army War College Study
on Military Professionalism, Army Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland
made yet another effort at corporate policing.24 He directed General
Walter T. Kerwin Jr., his deputy chief of staff for personnel, to reform the
officer selection system. Even more than fast-tracking high performers, he
emphasized it was essential to “institute a vigorous ‘selection out’ process” for those
officers whose toxic leadership or mediocre abilities were “highly detrimental”
20. US Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (DCSPER), “Quality of the Officer Corps: Staff Study,”
August 19, 1964, AHEC; and John T. English, “Military Personnel Management” (lecture, US Army War
College, February 27, 1957), AHEC.
21. R. N. Young, “Responsibilities and Problems of the Army G-1,” (lecture, US Army War College,
November 18, 1953), AHEC.
22. DCSPER, “Quality of the Officer Corps.”
23. Newton B. Morgan and Robert J. Morressey, “Premature Retirement of Senior Service College
Graduates—Why?,” March 9, 1970, AHEC; J. Robert Moskin, “Our Military Manpower Scandal,” Look 22
(March 18, 1958): 27–33; Max L. Pitney, “Retention of Junior Officers,” March 19, 1959, AHEC; and David
Byron Park, “An Analysis of the Factors Influencing the Retention of Junior Officers on Active Duty in the United
States Army” (master’s thesis, University of Washington, 1971).
24. US Army War College (USAWC), Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 1970).
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to the morale and effectiveness of their subordinates.25 Kerwin’s efforts to
incorporate Westmoreland’s mandate into the Officer Professional Management
System encountered great resistance from senior officers whose careers had
benefited from the existing methods. Most of the more ambitious initiatives,
including the identification and elimination of substandard officers, were not
implemented. Westmoreland’s successor, Creighton Abrams Jr., famously
warned field commanders, in his “pull up your socks” memo, that they would be
sanctioned if they inflated OERs. Within six months Abrams had been forced
to surrender, and OERs continued to rate the great majority of officers as
above average.26
Congressionally imposed postwar reductions cut active-duty officer strength
from 111,000 at the Vietnam War peak to 98,200 in 1976. Did the service
ensure this was a qualitative as well as quantitative reduction? According to
Secretary of the Army Robert E. Froehlke, the service’s boards had discharged
those “who, in the harsh light of competition, we felt would not measure up
in the longer haul.”27 Although the post-Vietnam officer elimination process
has been curiously understudied, it is clear the Army targeted specific skills,
reservists, Officer Candidate School graduates, and those lacking college
credentials. More revealingly, the cuts fell disproportionately on the lower grades.
Of the 4,900 officers involuntarily removed from active duty in fiscal year 1974,
all were at captain or major grade. These targeted eliminations so protected
the Regular Army senior leadership that in 1976 the Army’s grade structure
contained more lieutenant colonels (10,835) than lieutenants (10,320).28 This
disproportionate rank structure remained despite its original justification—that
a large corps of senior managers were necessary for wartime mobilization—had
essentially disappeared with the nation’s return to a small, all-volunteer professional
Army. Moreover, it occurred simultaneously with vacancies in the company
grades reaching “crisis proportions.”29
It might be argued the top-heavy rank structure reflects a higher standard
of professionalism. Presumably as officers advance in rank, they are subject to
ever-increasing institutional policing and thus become more expert and rigorous
25. William M. Donnelly, “Professionalism and the Officer Personnel Management System,” Military
Review 93 (May–June 2013): 17, emphasis original.
26. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2008), 356–57. On the lack of faith in the officer evaluation system, see Department of
the Army Historical Report (DOAHR), FY 73, 72–73; George B. Bartel, “Are the Troops Getting Enough
Officer Duty?,” Army 23 (September 1973): 41–42; and Lorraine A. Rossi, “Executive Appraisal: Confidence in
the Officer Evaluation System” (student paper, USAWC, AHEC, June 18, 1974).
27. Robert F. Froehlke, “Peace-Keeping with Pride and Integrity,” Army 22 (November 1972): 17.
28. Karl E. Cocke et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 1977), 40; and Karl E. Cocke, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year
1974 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1978), 54.
29. Arthur T. Coumbe, Army Officer Retention: Historical Context (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2010), 6.
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in upholding the profession’s standards for themselves and others. Officers
unwilling to accept these escalating professional standards depart. Unfortunately,
there is no evidence to support this trend. Rather, both survey and anecdotal
evidence indicates the primary reason the Army failed to retain high-quality
junior officers was that these officers perceived their seniors as lacking in both
professional ethics and competence. Supporting this view, in fiscal year 1979
one of five colonels and one of 10 lieutenant colonels declined command, the
majority on grounds command time would not advance their careers. Nor did
this trend get noticeably better in the “zero defects” force of the 1980s; one
command climate survey found that three in four officers believed the officer
corps was more focused on personal gain than professionalism.30

Implications
The great question remains. Why does a military institution that so
prides itself on its Huntington-derived definition of professionalism find
it so difficult to shed its deadwood? Additionally, why did this difficulty
persist even after Huntington defined officership as a profession because it
had, over a half-century of largely internal reforms, “applie[d] the standards
of professional competence and established and enforce[d] the standards of
professional responsibility?”31 Two explanations suggest themselves.
The first reason is that the professional corporate identity so valued by
Huntington impedes purging substandard personnel. A 1978 RAND study
found both Army officers and white-collar counterparts shared “an almost
pathological reluctance” to fire fellow managers. Instead, they “shelved” them
either through transfer or assignment to unimportant tasks.32 A career officer’s
disinclination to terminate underperforming colleagues may be even greater than
a white-collar equivalent due to emotional bonds established at the academy,
on troop duty, or through intermarriage between military families. This
inclination may also explain why the Army, unless forced by outside agencies,
had reduced its officer corps by lopping off personnel at the bottom of the
career ladder rather than known mediocrities, who are also peers.
A second reason is that Huntington failed to recognize that the rise of the
twentieth-century-professional US Army he extolled coincided with that
30. W. Berry, “Why They Quit,” Army 20 (December 1970): 3–4; William J. Hauser, “Professionalism and
the Junior Officer Drain,” Army 20 (July 1970): 17–22; Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Internal Army Surveys Suggest
Serious Concerns about Army’s Senior Leaders,” Armed Forces Journal International 122 (May 1985): 18–20;
and Anneliese M. Steele, “Are the Relationships between Junior and Senior Officers in the US Army Officer
Corps Dysfunctional?” April 30, 2001, Combined Arms Research Library.
31. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 10.
32. James H. Hayes, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with
Parallels from Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1978), 21.
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institution’s inability to retain enough high-quality career officers in the
6-to-12-year brackets during peacetime. The lack of sufficient high-performing
and proven company-grade officers choosing the service as a career creates a
vacuum that pulls lower-performing officers into the field grades. The result is a
self-perpetuating cycle of too many meritorious officers leaving, too many mediocre
officers rising, and the danger that the substandard becomes the new standard.33
Is it time to retire Huntington’s claim that corporateness equals
professional self-regulation as a structural pillar? To recognize that a profession’s
credentialing agencies exist more as gatekeepers to admission than as monitors
of lifetime adherence to its ethical or expert standards? To acknowledge that
once initiates have surmounted the hazing of the bar exam, the doctoral
dissertation, the medical boards, the tenure process, and so on, all further
enforcement of the profession’s ideals could well be interpreted as demonstrating
these policing agencies had failed?34
Perhaps today’s officers have become too complacent, claiming a Huntingtonbased professional status without reflecting on whether their institution is actually
following Huntington’s criteria. To some officers the very fact their careers are
successful proves that institutional self-policing not only exists but works! But
what of second-rate peers who are equally successful? When is quantity more
important than quality? When does Gresham’s Law apply to professions, and
when does the supply of bad officers begin to drive out the good?
These are all questions both the Army leadership and its officers must
constantly wrestle with. Perhaps, as occurred after the Vietnam War, it is
time for the Army officer corps to conduct a deep and hard examination of its
profession’s ideals and practices. An excellent start would be to recapture the
urgency that fueled the US Army War College professionalism and leadership
studies. Both studies shed a hard light on the state of the postwar officer corps
and inspired many members of the officer corps to reform their service.
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